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8 Abstract Any sniffer can see the information sent
9 through unprotected ‘probe request messages’ and ‘probe
10 response messages’ in wireless local area networks
11 (WLAN). A station (STA) can send probe requests to
12 trigger probe responses by simply spoofing a genuine
13 media access control (MAC) address to deceive access
14 point (AP) controlled access list. Adversaries exploit these
15 weaknesses to flood APs with probe requests, which can
16 generate a denial of service (DoS) to genuine STAs. The
17 research examines traffic of a WLAN using supervised
18 feed-forward neural network classifier to identify genuine
19 frames from rogue frames. The novel feature of this
20 approach is to capture the genuine user and attacker
21 training data separately and label them prior to training
22 without network administrator’s intervention. The model’s
23 performance is validated using self-consistency and five-
24 fold cross-validation tests. The simulation is comprehen-
25 sive and takes into account the real-world environment.
26 The results show that this approach detects probe request
27 attacks extremely well. This solution also detects an attack
28 during an early stage of the communication, so that it can
29 prevent any other attacks when an adversary contemplates
30 to start breaking into the network.
31Keywords Wireless LAN  Intrusion detection 
32Real-time systems  IEEE 802.11  DoS attacks 
33Feed-forward neural networks
341 Introduction
35Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
36Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) are based on IEEE
37802.11 protocol. The reliability of the media access control
38(MAC) layer of the IEEE 802.11 protocol is maintained by
39enforcing a response message from the access point (AP)
40for every request message from a station (STA). Attackers
41exploit this request-and-respond design flaw to generate
42probe request flood (PRF) attacks. Flooding attacks create
43severe performance dilapidations or decline of resources to
44genuine STAs when besieged by requests. Unprotected
45beacon or probe request and probe response frames which
46are sent ‘clear’ increase the risk of susceptibility. Usually,
47probing is the initial phase of any other attack in computer
48networks [1–7].
49Evaluations of detection systems require identification
50of genuine and rogue frames in the sample. Analysing
51frames of a WLAN test bed manually or statistically and
52detecting a rogue frame are possible to some extent due to
53its controlled nature. However, identifying rogue frames
54from genuine frames in a real network completely is an
55impossible task. Therefore, researchers use existing sample
56datasets or other sanitised or simulated traffic to develop
57and test intrusion detection proposals. Although they are
58rich in variety of genuine and attack traffic, and considered
59as a benchmark for evaluating security detection mecha-
60nisms, these datasets do not contain background noise that
61a real-world dataset consists of. Therefore, the solutions
62that develop based on these datasets may not work as
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63 efficiently and effectively as they claim to be in real-world
64 environments. This research investigates and analyses the
65 traffic of a real-world WLAN and, therefore, works with
66 actual WLAN frames [8–10].
67 The research seeks to identify existence of an adversary
68 in a WLAN at the beginning of a frame transmission, so
69 that it can prevent more disruptive attacks an adversary
70 may plan to perform. The research learnt that traffic pat-
71 terns are unforeseeable and have inherent complexities due
72 to many factors including usage, the operating system, user
73 applications, network prioritisation services, environmental
74 conditions and traffic load of capturing STA [11]. These
75 make this research a good candidate for artificial neural
76 networks (ANN) also commonly known as neural networks
77 (NN). NNs have a very high flexibility and, hence, can
78 analyse incomplete or partial data. However, WLAN traffic
79 and NN parallel processing feature can generate a signifi-
80 cant amount of overhead on the monitoring STA, which
81 can affect performance of the monitoring STA, and
82 sometimes can lead to a denial of service (DoS).
83 In order to classify as a user or attack frame, the research
84 analyses four distinct parameters only. These parameters
85 are sequence number and frame sub-type of a MAC frame;
86 a signal attribute, signal strength indicator (SSI); and sta-
87 tistical information, delta time value. Capturing and pro-
88 cessing few parameters have a low impact on the
89 monitoring STA. The preliminary work on selecting these
90 attributes has been published in Ratnayake et al. [12]. The
91 rest of the paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the
92 related current work on probing attack detection and pre-
93 vention using non-intelligent and intelligent methods; Sect.
94 3 defines the probe request attack detection methodology;
95 Sect. 4 discusses the WLAN organisation, data capturing
96 and preparation methods, NN design, evaluation and
97 results; and Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
98 2 Literature review
99 Many researchers have worked in the area of network
100 security looking for possible solutions for intrusion detec-
101 tion, to recognise an adversary attempting to gain access, or
102 have already compromised the computer network [13].
103 Ratnayake et al. [12] analysed non-intelligent and intelli-
104 gent wireless intrusion detection systems (WIDS). Non-
105 intelligent methods, also known as conventional methods
106 [2–4, 14–22], lack flexibility to adaptation to environ-
107 mental changes and therefore become outdated. WLAN
108 security researchers are now gradually moving towards
109 soft-computing techniques [5–7, 23–26]. Some of the
110 popular methods are self-organising maps, artificial
111 immune systems, fuzzy logic and neural models, adaptive
112 neural-fuzzy inference systems and hybrid models. They
113play a major role in current research due to their capability
114to overcome many integral weaknesses in conventional
115intrusion detection systems (IDS) such as adaptability
116issues, which require frequent updates and high computa-
117tion power and time. However, soft-computing techniques
118too suffer from their inherited design weaknesses such as
119requirement of training data; pre-processing of data, time
120and computing resources required for training or learning;
121validation; testing; optimisation and simulation of models.
122Further, less consideration is given to the most crucial
123issue of real-world data collection and real-world applica-
124tion. Training, validating and testing on real data and
125simulation on real data are very important in the process of
126bringing the research into real-world applications. Use of
127existing sample datasets such as KDD Cup ‘99 dataset and
128SNORT or other sanitised or simulated traffic to develop
129and test intrusion detection proposals is a popular approach
130in the current literature. The KDD Cup ‘99 dataset is cre-
131ated by processing the tcpdump portions of the 1998
132DARPA IDS evaluation dataset. DARPA normal dataset is
133a simulated synthetic data, and attack data are generated
134through scripts and programs. These datasets therefore do
135not contain information that a real-world dataset consists of
136[8–10]. SNORT database on the other hand has not been
137updated since year 2005. These problems also apply to
138solutions that are based on other sample databases and
139synthetic or sanitised traffic. Apart from the issues dis-
140cussed above, traffic generated from test beds also has the
141issue of limited environmental conditions as data will be
142collected from a controlled network by simulating traffic.
143Some solutions identify intrusive behaviours based on the
144exploration of known vulnerabilities.
145Collection and use of real-world traffic also makes the
146researcher understand the real-world issues that a security
147administrator may encounter whilst implementing a pro-
148posed application. However, real-world data collection can
149lead to biased data being used for training and testing, as
150there is no standard approach or guidelines for collecting
151and using traffic of a real network. Furthermore, as the
152dataset is unique to each experiment, results cannot com-
153pare with other research, unless one implements other
154methods on the same dataset to compare two methods.
155Furthermore, some of the existing studies do not explain
156how they recognised genuine and attack frames within the
157training traffic when real-world data are collected [6, 9].
158The research assumes that they may have collected attack
159and normal frames separately, or collect traffic whilst an
160attacker is available, and analysed manually to label them
161based on other features.
162Many of the existing approaches of intrusion detection
163have focused on the issues of feature extraction. Selecting
164input features based on the highest eigenvalue from a
165limited set of data may lead to losing many important and
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166 sensitive features, which can affect the efficiency and
167 effectiveness of the classifier. Almost no research evaluates
168 the results of a detection model’s performance to different
169 types of scenarios, e.g. when user and attacker(s) at dif-
170 ferent distances from AP, when only the attacker is present,
171 when there is no attacker, when there is more than one
172 attacker, when there are attackers with similar and different
173 network interface card (NIC) types, and so on. This lack of
174 information can confuse or mislead readers or future
175 researchers, as although their proposals are excellent in
176 technical and practical aspects, they may not reach the
177 outstanding results that other researches may have pub-
178 lished using non-challenging traffic.
179 Further, most of IDSs propose universal solutions to
180 intrusions. This research agrees with Liao et al. [27] who
181 suggest that the existing IDSs pose challenges to the cate-
182 gories that they claim they belong to. Many are extremely
183 complex proposals that are simulated and tested without
184 considering the practical implementation and computing
185 power, they may be required, therefore limited for academic
186 research world as implementation is too complex or expen-
187 sive. This issue has also been identified by Liao et al. [27].
188 There is a broad variety of statistical methods used in
189 the literature for measuring the performance of NNs [28,
190 29]. However, mean squared error (MSE), regression,
191 confusion matrices and operating characteristic (ROC)
192 curve are the most commonly used methods in the field of
193 intrusion detection using NN. In a previous publication,
194 this research implemented a prototype of the proposed
195 design as a function approximation application [12]. Per-
196 formance is evaluated using linear regression value R
2 and
197 MSE. The sensor trained outstandingly producing 98 %
198 overall regression, and MSEs 0.0039, 0.0038 and 0.0037 on
199 training, validation and test samples. However, simulation
200 of classifier in eight scenarios with 1,000 frame samples
201 resulted only in an average of 94.5 % detection rate.
202 Conventionally, probe request attack detection is a binary
203 classification application where the output can only have
204 two values, 1 (attack) or 0 (no attack). The research in [12]
205 applied standard linear regression and treated the output as
206 if it is binary, classifying any value of 0.5 or above as a ‘1’,
207 and anything below 0.5, as a ‘0’. Although standard linear
208 regression has been applied successfully for classification
209 in the past and in current research applications, statisticians
210 argue that linear regression should not be used for binary
211 classification applications, it violates many assumptions of
212 linear regression [30–32].
213 3 Probe request attack detection methodology
214 The process of establishing the IEEE 802.11 association
215 during an active scan is presented in Fig. 1. IEEE standard
216802.11 defines three frame types: management, control and
217data. The management frames set up and maintain com-
218munications. The control frames facilitate in the delivery of
219data. The data frames encapsulate the open system inter-
220connection (OSI) network layer packets. Each frame con-
221sists of a MAC header, frame body and a frame check
222sequence (FCS); however, contents of frames vary
223depending on the frame type. Probe requests are manage-
224ment frames and can be sent by anyone with a legitimate
225MAC address, as association with the network is not
226required at this stage. A typical management frame header
227comprises of following: a frame control field that defines
228the type of MAC frame and information to process the
229frame; a duration field that indicates the remaining time to
230receive the next frame; address fields that indicate MAC
231addresses of destination, source and AP; sequence control
232information to indicate the sequence number and fragment
233number of each frame. The frame body contains informa-
234tion specific to the frame type and sub-type. FCS contains
235an IEEE 32-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Another
236valuable set of information available to attackers as well as
237researchers is frame statistical details and radio information
238generated by the STA that is capturing. This information
239can be retrieved by using packet analysing software such as
240Wireshark. Some of the commonly used statistical infor-
241mation in the current research is frame arrival time, time
242delta value (time since the previous packet is captured),
243time since a referenced frame, frame number, actual packet
244length, captured packet length and protocols in frame. In
245Wireshark frame detail, the IEEE 802.11 radio information
246is available before the start of the IEEE 802.11 header. This
247contains signal strength, signal quality (noise), modulation
248type, channel type, data rate, channel number and other
249useful information for network and security administrators
250as well as adversaries [1, 5, 33].
251Through these detailed studies, it is learned that before
252an attack, the attacker actively or passively monitors the
253network to learn vital network information. MAC address
254spoofing is the next step. It is therefore recognised that any
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3 - Authentication Request
4 - Authentication Response
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6 - Association Response
Fig. 1 Active scan and WLAN association
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255 WIDS should address these initial stages of an attack
256 before moving on to more advance steps. After analysing
257 the previous research work and the progress of IEEE
258 802.11 sub-committees, it is understood that there is a gap
259 of knowledge to develop a realistic WIDS that could detect
260 probe request attacks on real WLANs. The aim of this
261 research is to provide a flexible, lightweight and low-cost
262 solution that detects an attack during an early stage of the
263 communication with high accuracy and avoid WIDS flaws
264 discussed above.
265 The research’s scope is to detect an external attacker on
266 a single-frequency band of a single AP WLAN. A high
267 computation power is required for a real-world imple-
268 mentation if a solution is to use the full range of fields of a
269 MAC frame, signal attributes and statistical information.
270 Therefore, the research created a short list of attributes
271 shown in Table 1, after studying the IEEE 802.11 specifi-
272 cation [1] and predominantly used attributes/features in
273 previous research on DoS attacks on WLANs [2–11, 14–
274 26]. The research then manually refined the list removing
275 features that attackers can easily change, and features
276 which are redundant and dependent, reducing the features
277 to sequence number and frame sub-type of a MAC frame,
278 signal attribute—signal strength indicator (SSI) and sta-
279 tistical information—delta time value to develop a WIDS.
280 In summary, a rogue STA cannot practically synchro-
281 nise with a sequence number pattern from a genuine STA.
282 Some signal attributes can be manipulated using identical
283 NICs and configuring accordingly. However, SSI is a
284 nearly impossible feature to mimic. Frame statistics such as
285frame arrival time is a reliable attribute that attackers
286cannot manipulate. Delta time gives time difference
287between two consecutive frames, which is a reliable attri-
288bute commonly used by network administrations to review
289traffic issues. Frame sub-type is a critical attribute identi-
290fying a frame type, but can be manipulated by rogue traffic
291generators and replay attackers; however, the frame sub-
292type manipulation can be detected when combined with
293other 3 features. Additionally, the research performed a
294proof-of-the-concept experiment [12] using data captured
295during an attack from a test bed WLAN. This pilot study
296provided an opportunity to prove the concepts of IEEE
297802.11 standard and to validate many unrealistic concepts
298based on unwarranted theoretical arguments.
299A WIDS should be able to capture and analyse frames
300and detect attacks automatically in a real network that is
301unpredictable by nature. After considering different intel-
302ligent models and their possible realistic and efficient
303application on the detection of probe request attacks, the
304research considered to utilise supervised feed-forward NN
305architecture. Feed-forward NNs are straightforward net-
306works that associate inputs with outputs, sending signals
307only in one direction with no feedback loops. Therefore,
308the output does not affect the same layer. Supervised NNs
309learn from examples. After training or learning, a NN
310system is able to detect intrusions, deal with varying nature
311of attacks. NNs are capable of processing nonlinear data.
312Therefore, data from several sources can be used in a
313coordinated fashion to detect attacks. NNs do not need to
314update frequently, as the generalisation feature enables the
Table 1 Feature selection
Attribute/feature An attacker can imitate
a genuine feature
Can replay
attacked
Duplicate/dependent
on other attributes
Sequence number No Yes No
Frame type Yes Yes Yes
Frame sub-type Yes Yes No
Duration Yes Yes No
SSID Yes Yes No
FCS No Yes No
Supported data rates Yes Yes No
Protocols in frame Yes Yes Yes
Frame length Yes Yes Yes
Power management Yes Yes No
Frame arrival time No No No
Frame relative arrival time No No Yes
Delta time No No Yes
Frame length captured No No Yes
SSI No No No
Channel type Yes No No
Channel number Yes No No
Data rate Yes No Yes
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315 NN to detect unknown and variants of known attacks.
316 Moreover, mostly used WLAN cards today have IEEE
317 802.11 g and n standard, which have a maximum data
318 transfer rates of 54 and 600 Mbps, respectively. Hence,
319 when the number of participating stations in the WLAN
320 increases, the number of frames to be captured and pro-
321 cessed by the WIDS also increases. A NN can also handle a
322 large quantity of data and has very high processing capa-
323 bility due to its parallel processing feature [34–36]. These
324 qualities make NNs a good candidate for detecting WLAN
325 attacks, particularly probe request attacks. However, this
326 solution is limited to detect probe request attacks only
327 whilst a real-world network may experience a cocktail of
328 attacks. This solution also cannot prevent probing attacks
329 and cannot detect any adversary not emitting frames.
330 Following is the summary of methodology applied for
331 data capturing, training, testing and evaluation of NN (Sect.
332 4 discusses these methods in detail):
333 • Apply filtering rules and capture sequence number,
334 delta time, SSI and frame sub-type.
335 • Capture frames from user and spoofed stations.
336 • Create master input and target vectors.
337 • Create sub-input and target vectors (folds) for NN
338 fivefold validation.
339 • Specify 20 hidden neurons and create NNs using each
340 fold
341 • Set data division percentages as 70/30 for training and
342 intermediate validation.
343 • Perform fivefold validation and measure performance
344 using MSE, confusion error and ROC.
345 • Choose the best performed NN based on confusion
346 error in test phase.
347 • Simulate trained NN with freshly captured data from
348 the WLAN, which was not used for training the NN or
349 part of the training dataset.
350 • Analyse performance using classification formulae
351 given in Table 2.
352 4 Probe request attack classifier design and evaluation
353 4.1 WLAN data capture and preparation
354 A wireless network with 8 user stations is utilised to cap-
355 ture delta time value, sequence number, received signal
356 strength and frame sub-type of the packets transmitted
357 between an AP, users and attackers (Fig. 2).
358 • AP is a Netgear DG834GT router with MAC address
359 00:0f:b5:1a:23:82. It is configured with WPA2-PSK
360 enabled controlled access list (CAL), so that only the
361 computers with the listed MAC addresses and network
362key could access the network resources. AP does not
363respond to computers with MAC addresses not listed in
364the CAL. Computers without a network key cannot
365associate with the AP. However, as shown in Fig. 1, AP
366replies with probe responses and authentication
367responses.
368• The user station Test1-PC is a DELL Inspiration 510 M
369laptop with an Intel
 Pentium 1.6 2 GHz micropro-
370cessor and 1 MB of random access memory (RAM),
371with Microsoft Windows XP operating system. Com-
372municates with AP using Intel(R) PRO/WLAN 2100
373mini PCI NIC with MAC address 00:0c:f1:5b:dd:b3.
374Microsoft Office 2007 is the main application software
375used. IE/Firefox, AVG, Skype, Teamviewer, are some
376of the other software that are been used.
377• Attacker Test2-PC is a Toshiba Satellite Pro laptop
378with an Intel
 Pentium M 740 (2 GHz) microproces-
379sor and 1.9 gigabytes of RAM, with Microsoft
380Windows XP. This attacker is spoofed using a
381commercially available spoofing tool, SMAC 2.0.
382SMAC 2.0 changes MAC addresses in Microsoft
383Windows systems, regardless of whether the manufac-
384turers allow this option or not .
385• The capturing/monitoring station Test3-PC is a Toshiba
386Satellite Pro laptop with an Intel
 Pentium M 740
387(2 GHz) microprocessor and 1.9 gigabytes of RAM,
388with BackTrack4 OS. An external network adaptor,
389Realtek RTL8187 Wireless 802.11 b/g, 54 megabytes,
390Wireless Universal Serial Bus (USB) 2.0 packet
391scheduler/mini adaptor, facilitated the monitoring sta-
392tion to be configured to monitor/promiscuous mode in
Table 2 Classification formulae [38–40]
TN coverage% ¼ TN
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (1)
FP coverage% ¼ FP
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (2)
FN coverage% ¼ FN
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (3)
TP coverage% ¼ TP
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (4)
TP rate% ¼ TP
FNþTP
 
 100 (5)
TN rate% ¼ TN
TNþFP
 
 100 (6)
FP rate% ¼ FP
TNþFP
 
 100 (7)
FN rate% ¼ FN
FNþTP
 
 100 (8)
þve Prediction precision% ¼ TP
TPþFP
 
 100 (9)
ve Prediction precision% ¼ TN
TNþFN
 
 100 (10)
Accuracy% ¼ TNþTP
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (11)
Confusion% ¼ FPþFN
TNþFPþFNþTP
 
 100 (12)
AQ1
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393 BackTrack environment, so that it receives and reads
394 all data packets transmitted using Wireshark. NIC in
395 promiscuous mode does not emit any frames. Moni-
396 toring is restricted to IEEE 802.11 WLAN channel
397 number 11—2,462 MHz due to heavy frame loss
398 experienced when capturing on all channels. Therefore,
399 monitoring statistics for STA’s behaviour on the entire
400 bandwidth is unavailable.
401 The research devised a novel method for capturing data.
402 The research captured frames from user and attacker sep-
403 arately and joined them to create sample training and
404 testing datasets as follows: Data capture is performed in
405 two phases. During the first phase (phase_1), genuine
406 frames are captured from user Test1-PC. The user is asked
407 to note the tasks performed during a specific time period.
408 During this period, the User Test1-PC accessed Internet to
409 browse information, download software, watch a live
410 television channel, listen to a live radio channel and check/
411 send emails. Second phase of the capture started immedi-
412 ately after the first phase. During the second phase
413 (phase_2), the Test1-PC is kept offline. Attacker Test2-PC
414 with its spoofed MAC address is made to send a flood of
415 probe request frames to the AP and made few network key
416 guessing attempts. Both user and attacker performed start-
417 up and shutdown procedures, network scans, network
418 connect and disconnect, and NIC repair (Table 3).
419 Preliminary checks have been performed to determine
420 that other attackers are not present during the capturing
421 period. A normal Wireshark capture consists of all frames
422 that are received by the NIC of the capturing station. Each
423frame contains a combination of MAC frame, radio and
424statistical data. Therefore, filtering rules are applied to
425A(a) Filter all frames with source address (wlan.sa)
42600:0c:f1:5b: dd:b3
427A(b) Filter delta time (frame.time_delta), sequence
428number (wlan.seq), SSI (radiotap.dbm_antsignal) and
429frame sub-type (wlan.fc.subtype) of each frame
430Phases 1 and 2 consisted of 157,060 and 19,570 frames,
431respectively.
4324.2 NN classifier training and evaluation
433In order to detect probe request attacks, a supervised feed-
434forward NN with 4 input neurons (deltaTime, sequence-
435Number, signalStrength and frameSubtype), 1 hidden layer
436with 20 neurons and an output neuron that determines
437genuine frames (0) from rogue frames (1) is implemented
438using MATLAB technical computing language. There are
439many conventional and modern theories and practices one
440can implement when determining the number of hidden
441neurons and layers [37]. A single layer is selected to reduce
442the complexity of the NN. The research trained the sample
443dataset with 1–50, step 5, neurons and identified the NN
444with 20 neurons is the best-performing NN based on MSE
445and convergence time. The network is trained using scaled
446conjugate gradient (trainscg) back-propagation function.
447This function is memory efficient and converges slowly.
448During training, the NN updates weight and bias values
449according to the following training parameters: maximum
                        Test1-PC  (User) 
Windows XP 
Intel(R) PRO/Wireless  
2100 3A Network card 
(00:0c:f1:5b:dd:b3) 
Test2-PC  
(Attacker) 
Windows XP with NetStumbler
BRIRAT 
(Access Point)  
Netgear DG834GT 
(00:0f:b5:1a:23:82) 
Test3-PC (Monitor) 
BackTrack4 - Wireshark 
WWW 
Test4-PC  
(Attacker) 
Windows XP with 
NetStumbler 
Test5-PC  
 (Attacker) 
Linux with network scanning tool 
Fig. 2 WLAN
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450 number of epochs = 100, MSE goal = 0, maximum time
451 to train = infinity, minimum performance gradi-
452 ent = 1e - 6, maximum validation failures = 5, second
453 derivative approximation value = 5.0e - 5, parameter for
454 regulating the indefiniteness of the Hessian = 5.0e - 7. It
455 uses tan-sigmoid transfer function in both hidden and
456 output layers as it scales the output values from zero to one.
457 One of the most common performance measurement
458 methods in use for evaluating a NN designed for classi-
459 fication is MSE. MSE is the average squared error
460 between the NN’s output and the target value of a com-
461 plete data sample. MSE = 0 means no errors. Values
462 closer to 0 are better. This research uses the MSE to
463evaluate and compare how the NN has learned the training
464data. After training, testing dataset is passed through the
465classification system. However, MSE does not give a clear
466picture of how a model classified its frames. A basic
467confusion matrix gives sums of correct and incorrect
468classifications based on true positive (TP), true negative
469(TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). These
470results can be further explained using formulae such as
471TN, FP, FN and TP coverage, and rate percentages,
472positive and negative prediction precision percentages,
473accuracy and confusion presented in Table 2.
474A series of FP and TP pairs plots a ROC. A ROC is a
475visual tool to recognise the positive and negative samples
Table 3 User and attacker
activities
Data segments
included
Starting record no. Action
User activities (Phase_1)
k1 1 Capture started
k1 315 Opened IE
k1 409 Googgled and played BBC2 live and stopped
k1 1901 Googgled and played BBC1 radio live
k1 7721 Checked Yahoo email
k1 21474 Sent an email
k1, k2, k3, k4, k5 22840 d/loaded a large file
K5 153240 Stopped BBC1 radio
k5 154670 d/load completed
k5 154686 Closed all opened windows
k5 154734 Disconnected from AP
k5 154769 Scanned network
k5 154860 Tried to connect to the network 3 times
k5 155363 Repaired the adaptor
k5 155640 Opened IE
k5 157001 Shut down
NIL Stopped capture
Attacker activities (Phase_2)
NIL Capture started
y1 1 Attacker started
y1 7 Directed probing attack started
y1 1577 Directed probing attack stopped
y1 1710 Network scanned 3 9 times
y1 1977 Tried to connect to the network with a guessed network key
y1 1846 Tried to connect to the network with a guessed network key
y1 1871 Tried to connect to the network with a guessed network key
y1 2223 Tried to connect to the network with a guessed network key
y1, y2, y3, y4, y5 2223 Directed probing attack started
y5 18941 Directed probing attack stopped
y5 19148 Network scanned 5 9 times
y5 19490 Tried to connect to the network with a guessed network key
y5 19551 Turned off the attacker
Nil Stopped capture
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476 that are incorrectly identified. When (0.1), the FP = 0 and
477 TP = 1, which indicates a perfect predictor. Therefore, the
478 more each curve hugs the left and top edges of the graph,
479 the better the prediction. The area beneath the curve can be
480 used as a measure of accuracy. ROC also encapsulates all
481 the information presented in a confusion matrix and
482 therefore commonly used by the researchers to show the
483 consistency of results [38, 41, 42].
484 However, a model’s performance can be misleading due
485 to over-fitting, which generally occurs when the model
486 training is not evaluated during the training process. Over-
487 fitted models do not perform well on unseen data. Typi-
488 cally, over-fitted models can be recognised from smaller
489 training confusion and larger testing confusion. This issue
490 is addressed by means of intermediate validation during
491 training. Self-consistency and cross-validation are among
492 several methods of estimating how well a trained model
493 will perform with unseen data, and detect and prevent over-
494 fitting of the model. Self-consistency is a method to eval-
495 uate the model’s performance with seen data. In self-con-
496 sistency test method, frames from phase_2 append to the
497 frames from phase_1 to use as the data sample (FoldAll),
498 and complete dataset (176,630 frames) is utilised for
499 training (70 %) and validation (30 %) phase. Therefore,
500 there is no wastage of training data. During the test phase,
501 the complete dataset (176,630 frames) is reused. However,
502 as the parameters of the NN are obtained from the training
503 dataset, error rate can be underestimated leading to a high
504 accuracy rate. Self-consistency test method does not
505 require much computation as training, validation and test-
506 ing are executed only once [43, 44].
507 In order to minimise bias present within the random
508 sampling of the data samples, K-fold cross-validation
509 methodology is used. Here, the original sample is parti-
510 tioned into k sub-samples. Then, the results from each fold
511 are averaged to generate a single estimation. Tenfold cross-
512 validation is most commonly used to reduce the wastage of
513 data in circumstances where there is a limited set of data.
514 However, when larger numbers of folds are applied to a
515 high data volume, it requires extra computations and pro-
516 cessing and is time-consuming [45]. As this research has a
517 large quantity of data, it is decided to use fivefold cross-
518 validation. The frames of phase_1 and phase_2 are divided
519 into 5 equal segments, as shown in Table 4 and labelled as
520 rogue or genuine, for the fivefold cross-validation.
521 The cross-validation process is repeated 5 times. Each of
522 the 5 sub-samples is used only once as the validation data,
523 i.e. each time a single sub-sample is retained to test the
524 model, whilst remaining 4 sub-samples are used as training
525 data. The system randomly divides the data sample and
526 uses 70 % of the data to train the network and 30 % for
527 validation. The MSEs of self-consistency (FoldAll) and
528 Fold1 to Fold5 test are shown in Table 5.
529Table 5 shows in a nutshell that the results are very
530much similar in every test. However, to understand and
531analyse the behaviours of MSE and confusion errors of
532cross-validation and self-consistency test, Figs. 3 and 4 are
533produced. In Fg. 4, Fold1 shows the best MSEs 0.0022 and
5340.0018 for training and validation, respectively. However,
535Fold1 test records the worst MSE 0.0167. Further, it shows
536that Fold1 significantly deviates from the rest of the folds.
537The worst MSE during training is generated by Fold5.
538Fold4 shows the worst MSE during validation and best
539MSE during test. Further, it also shows that MSEs of test
540are higher than the training and validation in Fold1 and
541Fold2, which indicates an over-fit. Figure 4 shows that the
542confusion percentages of the classifiers are extremely low,
543resulting in an accuracy rate ranging from 98.19 to
54499.88 % during training, validation and test. Fold1 shows
545the lowest confusion rates 0.22 and 0.19 % for training and
546validation, respectively. However, Fold1 test records the
547highest confusion 1.81 %. Further, it shows that Fold1
548relatively significantly deviates from the rest of the folds.
549The highest confusion during training is 0.59 %, generated
550in Fold5. The highest confusion during validation is gen-
551erated in Fold4. The least confusion during test is 0.12,
552produced in Fold4. Further, it also shows that confusions of
553tests are higher than the training and validation in Fold1
554and Fold2. Both MSE and confusion values of self-con-
555sistency test have a clear least deviation among training,
556validation and test results: self-consistency test reports
557MSEs as 0.0043, 0.0045, 0.0043 (Fig. 3) and confusions, as
5580.47, 0.50, and 0.47 % (Fig. 4). The ROC curves in Fig. 5
559are a graphical representation of sensitivity and specificity.
560It also visually summarises the results of fivefold cross-
561validation (Fold1–Fold5) tests and self-consistency test
562(FoldAll) presented in the confusion matrix. Figure 6 is a
563cross-section of Fig. 5. In the graph, all curves hug the left
564and top edges of the plot, which proves that the trained
565NNs are nearly perfect predictors. Further, the area beneath
566the curves also shows a high measure of accuracy.
567In summary, Fold1 and Fold2 have a risk of overfitting,
568as its test confusion is greater than the validation confu-
569sion. From the remaining Folds3–5, Fold4 with test con-
570fusion rate 0.12 % has the least confusion, therefore
571becomes the best-performing model. Therefore, Fold4
572qualifies to simulate with unseen data. The information in
573Table 6 is obtained by applying TP, TN, FP and FN results
574attained from the Fold4 test phase to classification formu-
575lae in Table 2.
576The overall analysis of these results in Table 6 shows
577that there are no major deviations in results that is gener-
578alised, when calculating confusion or accuracy. The con-
579fusion percentage is extremely low, resulting in an
580accuracy rate of 98.5 % on unseen test dataset. This indi-
581cates that the classifier’s performance is nearly perfect.
Neural Comput & Applic
123
Journal : Large 521 Dispatch : 30-8-2013 Pages : 14
Article No. : 1478
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : NCA-3163 h CP h DISK4 4
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
582 Furthermore, high sensitivity and specificity rates prove the
583 robustness and stability of the NN model. The Fold4 ROC
584 presented in Figs. 5 and 6 hugs the left and top edges of the
585 plot, graphically proves the consistency of the NN and the
586 area beneath the curve illustrates high measure of accuracy.
587To understand the results in Tables 5 and 6, and in
588Figs. 3, 4, 5 and 6, the user and attacker activities during
589the capturing period presented in Table 3 are analysed with
590data segments used for NN training, validation and testing
591(Table 4). Fold5 uses data segments 1, 2, 4 and 5 to train
592the network and leaves segment 3 to test the network. The
593analysis in Table 3 indicates that the training sample with
594segments 1, 2, 4 and 5 is diverse. It also shows that trained
595NN performs considerably well with unseen data.
Table 4 Data segmentation method
Data segments (k ? y) Genuine frames from normal user (Phase_1) Rogue frames from attacker (Phase_2) Running total
Start End Start End
k1 ? y1 0 31,412 0 3,914 35,326
k2 ? y2 31,413 62,824 3,915 7,828 70,652
k3 ? y3 62,825 94,236 7,829 11,742 105,978
k4 ? y4 94,237 125,648 11,743 15,656 141,304
k5 ? y5 125,649 157,060 15,657 19,570 176,630
Table 5 MSE and confusion errors of self-consistency and fivefold
validation
Description FoldAll Fold1 Fold2 Fold3 Fold4 Fold5
Train
sample
1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4 2,3,4,5 3,4,5,1 4,5,1,2 5,1,2,3
Test sample 1,2,3,4,5 5 1 2 3 4
MSE
Training 0.0043 0.0022a 0.0039 0.0044 0.0051 0.0053b
Validation 0.0045 0.0018a 0.0045 0.0045 0.0052b 0.0049
Test 0.0043 0.0167b 0.0058 0.0018 0.0012a 0.0014
Confusion
Training
(%)
0.47 0.22a 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.59b
Validation
(%)
0.50 0.19a 0.49 0.50 0.58b 0.54
Test (%) 0.47 1.81b 0.68 0.18 0.12a 0.13
a Lowest value
b Highest valueh
Fig. 3 MSEs of cross-validation and self-consistency tests
Fig. 4 Confusions of cross-validation and self-consistency tests
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Fig. 5 ROC curves of Fold1 to Fold5 and self-consistency tests
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596 4.3 Simulation results and discussion
597 In addition to the attacker Test2-PC utilised in the training
598 capture, two new attackers are utilised for simulation,
599 namely Microsoft Windows-based Test4-PC and Linux-
600 based Test5-PC.
601 • The attacker station Test4-PC is a DELL Inspiron
602 510 M laptop identical to TEST1-PC. This attacker is
603 spoofed using SMAC 2.0.
604 • Attacker Test5-PC is a Toshiba Satellite Pro laptop
605 with an Intel
 Pentium M 740 (2 GHz) microproces-
606 sor and 1.9 gigabytes of RAM, with Linux-based
607 Ubuntu 9.10 OS. NIC is Netgear WG111T 108 Mbps
608USB 2.0 Adapter. This attacker is spoofed using
609macchanger spoofing tool.
610Frames are captured using the capturing STA Test3-PC.
611Capturing sessions varied to collect adequate number of
612frames, approximately 3,000 frames per session. Traffic
613captured from user STAs is normal uncontrolled traffic.
614However, the research generated the probe request attacks
615using NetStumbler and Linux network scanning tool.
616Trained NN is simulated using the pre-defined scenarios as
617shown in Table 7. Frames are captured by using Wireshark
618capturing software with same filtering rules, A(a) and A(b),
619when capturing training data. Data are captured in
620numerical form. Therefore, no conversion is needed.
621Figure 7 shows security administrator’s probe request
622attack monitoring screen. The system tabulates classifier’s
623output values against frame numbers. Output bounds are
624(0,1). Ideally, the output value should be zero, which
625means ‘no attack’. There are many schools of thought as to
626how one classifies a frame into an attack or genuine class.
627This research uses the most common method, that is,
628frames with output neuron value equal or higher than 0.5
629are classified as attack or positive frames (1), whilst others
630are classified as genuine or negative frames (0). However,
631in real-world situations, security administrators can set the
632threshold value depending on the degree of sensitivity
633required. A real-world application also can provide more
634information on the screen such as the MAC address, time
635and other statistics. However, this research cannot verify
636the accuracy of the detection system from Fig 7. Therefore,
637result validation requires comparing the actual results with
638expected results.
639The Fig. 8 tabulates the squared difference between the
640expected value (target) and the actual result (output) of
641each frame of the complete dataset, and produces an error
642value scaled from zero to one. A frame’s error = zero
643means ‘no error’, that frame is correctly classified. The
644MSE of the dataset is 0.034262, which is a value very close
645to zero that is statistically a good performance. This also
646generates 4.1 % overall confusion resulting 95.9 % of
647overall accuracy from the 10 simulation samples used in
648Table 7. The individual simulation results of pre-defined
649scenarios shown in Table 7 are tabulated in Table 8.
650Following is the interpretation of the results of Table 8.
6514.3.1 Detection rate of known and unknown attacks
652This research refers the NetStumbler attack frames that the
653NN is trained with as known attacks. Unknown attacks are
654frames generated from software that were not used for
655training the NN. The results of simulations 34, 36–38 show
656that the NN has detected between 99.66 and 100 % of
657known NetStumbler attacks. The results of simulation 40
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Fig. 6 A cross-section of ROC curves
Table 6 Confusion matrix of Fold4 test
Description Fold4
Training data segments (ky) 4,5,1,2
Test data segment 3
Testing sample 35,326
TP 3,892
TN 31,393
FP 19
FN 22
TP coverage 11.02 %
TN coverage 88.87 %
FP coverage 0.05 %
FN coverage 0.06 %
Sensitivity TP 99.44 %
Specificity TN 99.94 %
FP 0.06 %
FN 0.56 %
Positive prediction precision 99.51 %
Negative prediction precision 99.93 %
Accuracy 99.88 %
Confusion 0.12 %
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658 show that NN has detected 95.89 % of unknown Linux
659 network scanning tool attacks. The accuracy of trained NN
660 was 99.88 % (Table 6). Therefore, whilst the detection
661 rates of known attacks (sim34, 36–38) are 99.5, 100, 100
662 and 100 %, respectively, the detection of unknown attacks
663 shows 4.11 % reduction.
6644.3.2 Effect of the movement of an attacker and a user
665It was observed that when the NetStumbler attacker was at
666a general distance or far away location within the signal
667range, the detection rate was 99.66–100 % (sim34 and 36).
668When the NetStumbler attacker was at the same locations
669as the user, the detection rate was only 72.91 % (sim35).
670However, it is a nearly impossible scenario in a non-public
671WLAN. The results of sim39 showed that the detection rate
672reduces when user moves away from the signal range.
673When the captured data are analysed, it is observed that
674when a genuine user scans a network excessively, it can
675raise a false alarm, because it generates unusually a large
676number of probe requests. This can occur due to an ill-
677configured WLAN card, weak signal strength or as in this
678case, user deliberately scanning the network. This may
679require network administrator’s attention and can be solved
680within the system by setting a threshold value of warnings
681to be tolerated per second to suit to specific users or net-
682work. However, user’s mobility within the signal range
683does not affect the detection rate very much, and therefore,
684this solution enables the WLAN users to change their
685location of work in contrast to some experiments that
686required user stations to be static.
6874.3.3 Effect of the user and an attacker’s presence
688at the same time
689The NN was simulated (sim41) using a random combina-
690tion of data used for sim31 and sim34, which is an unseen
691dataset from user and attacker using NetStumbler (known
692attack). In this scenario, sensitivity and specificity of the
693scenario was 98.18 and 99.66 % respectively, which was
694similar to sensitivity and specificity of sim31 and sim34.
695However, there is a reduction in positive prediction rate
696from 100 to 96.58 % and negative prediction rate from 100
697to 99.82 % in sim41. Further, it reports a 1.31 % of
Table 7 Tests conducted
Sim code Test scenario
Sim31 Unseen dataset from user (Test1-PC)
Sim39 Unseen dataset from user (Test1-PC) far away from AP
Sim34 Unseen dataset from attacker (Test2-PC) using NetStumbler
Sim35 Unseen dataset with attacker (Test2-PC) at the same location as the user
Sim36 Unseen dataset with attacker (Test1-PC) far away from user’s location
Sim37 Unseen dataset with new attacker (Test4-PC) using NetStumbler
Sim38 Unseen dataset with 2 attackers (Test2-PC and (Test4-PC) using NetStumbler
Sim40 Unseen dataset with an attacker using a Linux network scanning tool (Test5-PC)
Sim41 Unseen dataset from user (Test1-PC) and attacker (Test2-PC)using NetStumbler
Sim42 Unseen dataset from user (Test1-PC) and an attacker using a Linux network scanning tool
(Test5-PC)
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698 confusion, which is a rate higher than sim34, less than
699 sim31. sim42 utilised a random combination of data used
700 for sim31 and sim40, which is an unseen dataset from user
701 and an attacker using a Linux network scanning tool
702 (unknown attack). In this scenario too, the sensitivity and
703 specificity of the model was 95.89 and 98.18 % respec-
704 tively, which was similar to sensitivity and specificity of
705 sim31 and sim40. Again, there is a reduction in positive
706 prediction rate from 100 to 96.53 % and negative predic-
707 tion rate from 100 to 97.85 % in sim42. Further, it reports a
708 2.61 % of confusion, which is a rate less than sim40 and
709 higher than sim31. It is clear that confusion rate slightly
710 increases during an unknown attack. However, this
711 experimentation shows that the model could still detect an
712 unknown attack with 97.39 % accuracy.
713 5 Conclusion
714 This experimental study is carried out to detect probe
715 request attacks by analysing real WLAN traffic frames of a
716 STA using a NN classifier. The supervised feed-forward
717 NN classifier analyses four distinct parameters such as
718 delta time, sequence number, signal strength and frame
719 sub-type, and identify and differentiate a genuine frame
720 from a rogue one. Currently, identifying genuine and rogue
721 frames from real-world traffic for NN training is conducted
722 manually, which is labour-intensive. The proposed solution
723 enables security administrators to train the NN with a
724diverse combination of separately captured genuine user
725data and rogue attacker data when necessary. The experi-
726mental results demonstrate that the NN model can detect
727probe request attacks to a very high degree. The proposed
728solution detects an attack during an early stage of the
729communication. The solution also works when network
730prioritisation services like quality of service (QoS) is
731enabled and works well when the genuine user is offline.
732Furthermore, although the detection rates slightly drop
733when STAs move to boundaries of the network, the solu-
734tion does not limit the genuine STA’s movement within the
735network. Monitoring only delta time, sequence number,
736signal strength indicator and frame sub-type considerably
737reduces the overhead of the monitoring machine, whilst
738producing the expected results as all four fields are nearly
739impossible to manipulate at any one time. Therefore, this is
740an efficient, lightweight and low-cost solution, compared to
741solutions currently available, which needs capturing and
742processing STAs with high computing power. Furthermore,
743this may also ease the housekeeping of training data, as
744administrators can remove unnecessary parts of training
745data easily and add new training data without having to
746recapture already available data in circumstances such as
747replacing or upgrading a STA. This research, by design, is
748limited to a single-frequency band of a single AP WLAN
749and can only detect an external attacker. However, the
750applicability of this research can be improved including
751features relevant to channel and AP. More research has to
752be done to improve detection rates when STAs are very
Table 8 Summary of tests conducted
Description Sim31 Sim39 Sim34 Sim35 Sim36 Sim37 Sim38 Sim40 Sim41 Sim42
Complete sample 5,782 3,595 2,975 2,905 2,837 2,026 3,088 3,045 8,827 8,757
TP 0 0 2,965 2,118 2,837 2,026 3,088 2,920 2,965 2,920
TN 5,677 3,180 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,677 5,677
FP 105 415 0 0 0 0 0 0 105 105
FN 0 0 10 787 0 0 0 125 10 125
TP coverage (%) 0.00 0.00 99.66 72.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.89 33.86 33.08
TN coverage (%) 98.18 88.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 64.83 64.31
FP coverage % 1.82 11.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20 1.19
FN coverage (%) 0.00 0.00 0.34 27.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.11 0.11 1.42
Sensitivity TP (%) NaN NaN 99.66 72.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.89 99.66 95.89
Specificity TN (%) 98.18 88.46 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 98.18 98.18
False ?ve discovery rate (%) 1.82 11.54 NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 1.82 1.82
False -ve discovery rate (%) NaN NaN 0.34 27.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.11 0.34 4.11
?ve Prediction precision (%) 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.58 96.53
-ve Prediction precision (%) 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 NaN NaN NaN 0.00 99.82 97.85
Accuracy (%) 98.18 88.46 99.66 72.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 95.89 98.69 97.39
Confusion (%) 1.82 11.54 0.34 27.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.11 1.31 2.61
Some formulae generate NaN values when either user or attack frames are presented for calculations where calculations require both user and
attack frames
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753 close to the AP and far away from APs, and to understand
754 the issues of updating the NN with new attack types and
755 user scenarios.
756
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